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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
INFANTS--MINOR'S LIABILITY WHEN FALSELY MISREPRESENTING
AGE-LIABILITY FOR DEPRECIATION.-Where a minor has falsely repre-
sented himself to be of legal age and thus purchased an automobile
(not a necessity), he is not estopped by such misrepresentation from
setting up his infancy in avoidance of the contract, and where the
seller takes possession of the automobile, the minor is entitled to re-
cover the amount paid by him, without diminution either for the
use of the automobile during the time he had possession of it or for
damages accruing from depreciation and wear and tear on the same.
Summit Auto Co. v. Jenkins, 20 Oh. App. 229, 153 N. E. 153 (1925).
It is held that an infant is not liable for torts arising out of
contracts. Moore v. Eastman, 1 Hun. (N. Y.) 578 (4th Dept. 1874);
Raymond v. General Motorcycle Co., 230 Mass. 54, 119 N. E. 359
(1918). The theory being that the tort is inseparable from the con-
tract. In Miller v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 188 Mo. App. 402, 174
S. W. 166 (1915), it was held, where an infant executed an instru-
ment which recites that he is of age is not thereby estopped from relying
on infancy though he reached the age of discretion.
In New York we find a modification to the rule stated. Here
the rule is that where an infant misrepresents his age and the other
party is injured in reliance thereon, the infant will be held for his
tort. Eckstein v. Frank, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 334 (1863). A similar hold-
ing is found in other jurisdictions. Thus, in the case of Thosath v.
Transport Motor Co., 240 Pac. 921 Wash. (1925), it was held a minor
could not recover payments made on a purchase of a second-hand
automobile on the disaffirmance of his contract by him, where he de-
clared that he stood sil.ent when asked if he were of age and subse-
quently admitted that he may have said he was of age and in the written
agreement to seller, he disclosed he was twenty-two years old, such state-
ment constituting positive misrepresentation. New York went a step
further than the Eckstein case in the case of Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y.
578, 55 N. E. 275 (1899). This case directly opposes the Summit case
as to without diminution either for use of the automobile, etc. The
Rice case held that where an infant in an action to recover from
the vendor the amount paid on the contract, upon disaffirmance of the
contract he (infant) must account for the reasonable use of the bi-
cycle or its deterioration in value.
The New York rule seems to be sounder than the Ohio adjudica-
tions on two grounds. It is more equitable and there is less oppor-
tunity afforded the infant to defraud innocent merchants.
MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY-FINDING MOTHER RIDING IN
OWN CAR DRIVEN BY MINOR DAUGHTER RETAINED CONTROL JUSTIFIED.
-An automobile was driven by the minor daughter of the defendant
who accompanied her daughter and was present at the time of the
accident. This automobile was the property of the defendant and
her husband. Through the negligence of the minor daughter a col-
lision occurred. An action was brought against the parent on the
theory of master and servant. Judgment was given to plaintiff and
defendant appeals. Held, if the parent permits a minor child to drive
an automobile under parent's direction for parents, the defendant
parent is responsible for the negligent act of the daughter driving
the automobile, even the minor is not receiving any pay and hi the
RECENT DECISIONS
eyes of the law the relation of master and servant is created. Judg-
ment affirmed. Fuller v. Metcalf, 130 Atl. 875 (Sup. Ct. Me. 1925).
.The authorities are unanimous in holding that a master is always
liable for the negligence of his servant while in the course of the
master's business. Round v. Delware Lana W. Ry. Co., 64 N. Y.
129, 21 Am. Rep. 597 (1876); 2 Cooley, Torts, 1925, sec. 3; Cosgrove
v. Ogden, 49 N. Y. 255 (1872). The mere fact that the relation of
parent and child is present should in no way affect the relation of
principal and agent with consideration given to the fact that the
minor receives no compensation for his services. Johnson v. New-
man, 271 S. W. 705 (1925); Daggy v. Miller, 180 Ia. 1151, 162 N. W.
859 (1917) ; Kelley v. Thbodeau, 120 Me. 402, 115 Atl. 162 (1921). The
payment of money is not necessary to create the relation of master
and servant as long as there is some valuable consideration given in
return. 2 Cooley, Torts 1007. There are some cases which hold that
upon some facts as in principal case the parent would be classed as
a mere guest and no liability can be attached to him. Reiter v.
Graber, 173 Wis. 493, 181 N. W. 739 (1921); 18 A. L. R. 362. But
the soundness of the above rule is questioned and is not considered
the better of the two rules. Where an automobile is in the possession
of a bailee there is without doubt no liability placed on the owner
although he is present in the car. Potts v. Pardee, 220 N. Y. 431,
116 N. E. 78 (1917), 8 A. L. R. 785; Pease v. Montgomery, 111 Me.
582, 88 Atl. 973 (1913). But in the principal case the minor daughter
was not a bailee of the automobile but was a servant of the defendant
parent. A passenger who is also the owner (not a bailee) who
accepts services rendered his right of control of automobile and every
reason for the application of the doctrines of respondet superior is
present.
CORPORATIONS-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT IN CONTRACT FOR LAND SALE
WHERE PRINCIPAL IS A NoN-EXISTENT CORPORATION-In an action for
specific performance of a written contract for the sale and transfer of
realty, the defendant herein fraudulently represented himself to be the
agent of a non-existent corporation, alleged to be in the process of
formation. The contract proceeds in the customary form employed
in the sales of real property with the duly attested signatures of the
plaintiffs and the corporation by the defendant as agent. The plain-
tiffs seek to hold the defendant as the real purchaser and demand
judgment against him as the real vendee for specific performance of
the contract. It is further alleged that defendant committed a fraud
in representing to the plaintiffs that a certain corporation was then
being effected by him and in process of incorporation under the laws of
the State of New York. Held, in the Lower Court, the learned judge
held that the grounds of the complaint were untenable and accordingly
dismissed the case. This ruling was affirmed by the Appellate Division.
"Weiss et al. v. Baum, 217 N. Y. Supp. 820 (App. Div. 2nd Dept. 1926).
The Court recognized that the proposition presented here appears
not to have been decided in New York but the principles involving the
personal liability of one assuming to act as agent for a non-existent
principal or claiming a power of agency without authority, have been
frequently set forth. Plew v. Board, 274 Ill. 232, 113 N. E. 603 (1916).
Earlier decisions in New York supporting such liability have been re-
garded by the Courts as "substantially repudiated." White v. Madison,
